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Abstract Nihilism is not escaped by decree. Its subjective frameworks remain with 
us. To those educators who remain wedded, despite everything, to the idea of 
mastery – and this represents most of us – it is worth considering how an exit might 
look, one that operates through, rather than in spite of, the promise of mastery. This 
would be an exercise in Sade’s Reason, as Maurice Blanchot would have it. This 
would be an attempt to practice mastery without enslavement, passing through 
enslavement to its opposite. So let us imagine education as mastery, as its 
fulfilment, and see how that might look. 
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By the Throat 
Mastery has us by the throat. Unable to bring things up, prevented from taking 
things down—if we swallow, we do so without conviction. Mastery catches and 
keeps us mid-gasp. 
In pursuit of mastery, education fell before its promised transcendence. 
Mastery claimed to elevate the educated philosopher above the quotidian, even 
make the philosopher immune to the world below and its persecutions. Yet mastery 
was yoked to its opposite: the enslavement of the philosopher to a philosophical 
doctrine. Mastery required discipline and self-control. It subordinated the self to a 
philosophical doctrine, wagering the self to an ordinance that promised future 
sovereignty but demanded present obedience. 
Seeking spiritual direction, early philosophers enslaved themselves to their 
chosen philosophical school. Consultations were offered to non-philosophers too, 
for a fee. Whether a school was joined or merely visited, the spiritual direction on 
offer was intended, in its final effects, to allow each candidate to “take control and 
become master of [her]himself.”i With Christianity and its selective adoption of 
ancient philosophy, self-mastery became “an instrument of subordination” of more 
complete effect.
ii
 Its voluntary dimension was reduced as spiritual training came to 
occupy the whole life of the Christian subject. The purpose of Christian guidance 
was to develop a form of introspection that would “fix more firmly the relationship 
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of subordination”; it would attach its recipients to a regime of power that would 
take care of their entire life in all its detail and for the rest of its duration.
iii
 At the 
same time, the promise of transcendence became ever more spectral, dependent 
ultimately on God’s will, against which the strength of will exhibited by the self-
denying Christian was of secondary importance. For at the gates of heaven, God 
decides. On earth, the early Christian monk is warned against practising any self-
denying ordinance to excess. We find Cassian recalling tales of monks casting 
themselves down wells, fasting excessively, or crossing deserts without food in an 
effort to demonstrate just how catastrophically they had achieved self-mastery, 
purging themselves of natural inclinations and desires.
iv
 These were not acts of 
extreme piety; they were symptomatic of pride. And pride is of the devil.  
With extreme asceticism the old but sinuous link connecting the promise of 
mastery to the necessity of enslavement calcified, and then broke. Early Christian 
ascetic practitioners, those Cassian warned against, so perfected their self-denials 
that they became increasingly indifferent to pain and discomfort, removing 
themselves beyond the grasp of power. Through enslavement they reached its 
opposite denying themselves so completely that little remained for power to attack. 
In this advanced form asceticism posed a challenge to Christianity, delivering its 
practitioners beyond the influence of its institutions and teachings. The most potent 
ascetics effectively reversed the self-denials of monastic obedience, transforming 
these denials into a form of “egoistic self-mastery” that denied access to external 
power.
v
  
To secure their foothold monastic and ecclesiastical institutions had to bring 
self-mastery back within their control. They would purge themselves of all vagrant, 
self-sufficient, ascetic heresies, and bring all miracles, marvels, punishments and 
self-flagellations back into the orbit of their influence. Eventually self-mastery 
would slip its “doctrinal moorings” and migrate to a secular context.vi Education 
remains in awe of mastery. It preaches denial, yokes its members to the pursuit of 
mastery, but will not allow that mastery to become realised as such. Mastery haunts 
education as its most enduring spectral promise.  
Just what exactly education promises mastery of, changes: from ancient self in 
pursuit of wisdom, to medieval body desiring knowledge of God, to modern subject 
of autonomous reason, and finally, to the promise that we might one day master our 
own performativities. By definition such mastery is rarely, if ever achieved. Our 
nihilism is the product of this framework, this belief that education requires higher 
objectives, a belief so well entrenched that as each objective comes under attack 
another is substituted in its place. When substitutes are left wanting, we are 
launched into overproduction. For we scarcely know how to operate let alone 
educate without the promise of mastery. Once described as the “destiny of two 
millennia of Western history,” nihilism is our unavoidable affliction.vii Those 
educators claiming to exist beyond its reach are in denial. There is no quick and 
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easy escape. We are trapped in the digestive tract of Western history. Attached to a 
promise that is never delivered, we are its disappointments, you and I. We are 
debased and we debase ourselves, desiring mastery through our enslavement. 
 
Sade as Educator 
Nihilism is not escaped by decree. Its subjective frameworks remain with us. To 
those educators who remain wedded, despite everything, to the idea of mastery—
and this represents most of us—it is worth considering how an exit might look, one 
that operates through, rather than in spite of, the promise of mastery. This would be 
an exercise in Sade’s Reason, as Maurice Blanchot would have it.viii This would be 
an attempt to practice mastery without enslavement, passing through enslavement to 
its opposite. So let us imagine education as mastery, as its fulfilment, and see how 
that might look.  
Justine; Juliette; Philosophy of the Boudoir; The 120 Days of Sodom, these are 
scandalous books and scandalise us still.
ix
 And yet, whilst there is “no better symbol 
of scandal” than the Marquis de Sade, “the scandalous audacity of his thought has 
remained long unknown.”x This was Blanchot’s analysis. Sade’s books were 
excessive in every sense, that much we perceive, but what we fail to see is how in 
their excess they exaggerate our own basic attachments. We find ourselves 
confronted with work of horrific, “unsurpassable monstrosity,” though “rationalist 
in construction” and “pedagogic in genre.”xi Sade’s offence, in short, was to follow 
through; it was to express the idea of mastery inherent in reason, and the idea of 
education inherent in mastery. It was to bring education, mastery and reason to their 
conclusion.  
These are educational texts. They are relentlessly, tediously educational, 
perhaps unrivalled in their singular commitment to the course of instruction. 
Juliette, their most accomplished student, must surpass, then abandon, perhaps even 
sacrifice each teacher she encounters in her pursuit of mastery.
xii
 Initially Juliette 
misunderstands, hoping that her teacher will be her protector in crime and 
debauchery. But as Noirceuil explains, “one must learn to manage by oneself, to 
rely upon one’s own solitary resources.”xiii Juliette must learn to practice mastery 
alone, eventually becoming master of herself. Her education demands absolute 
commitment to vice. Failure is inexcusable. Even the slightest indication of failure 
will invoke severe reprisal, if not an attempt on her life from those who were 
formerly her teachers.
xiv
 Only later does she realize that, by extension, her “whole 
ambition shall be someday to surpass my teacher.”xv  
One might expect that in attempting to surpass her teachers in mastery Juliette 
would aspire to become the most exemplary teacher herself. Indeed, this is what 
Juliette first assumes:  
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I keenly sense my need of instruction, I no less keenly desire to 
educate someone: I must have a teacher, yes, and I must have a pupil 
too.
xvi
  
 
By the time Juliette finally acquires her pupil, however, she is on the road to 
becoming such an accomplished libertine, so apathetic to the plight of others that 
she looses all interest in teaching those far beneath her.
xvii
 Juliette so bores of her 
assigned pupil Alexandrine that she dispatches of her, and her biography, in a mere 
paragraph so as to avoid ever having to mention her again.
xviii
 Rather significantly, 
Alexandrine’s swift demise is attributed to the very poor instruction she received 
from her tutor, Juliette.
xix
 Hence, in Sade we discover how the desire to outdo one’s 
teachers in mastery could be fatal to teaching, and so to education. The desire to 
achieve mastery certainly does not breed a desire to surpass one’s teachers in 
teaching, to become a better teacher.  
If Juliette’s teachers are ever annihilated, this only occurs once they are found 
wanting from the perspective of her own developing supremacy. She respects her 
teachers as long as their libertine mastery is assured. They are heeded for as long as 
they can teach, and teach by example. Otherwise Juliette would have “bled them 
white”, as she puts it, at the first opportunity.xx Overcome here, then, are centuries 
of Christian toleration, where mastery is to be diligently pursued but never 
presumed to become fully manifest, even in the most holy, for that would lead to a 
dangerous asceticism. Overcoming all tolerations, the libertine student will no 
longer suffer the teacher who does not in all completeness bear out his 
philosophical teachings in his actions. Through education, the libertine adopts that 
ancient logic of mastery found inherent in education, unshackles it, and drives the 
pursuit of mastery to its hilt.  
On the nature of libertine mastery some clarification is necessary, since in the 
context of Sade’s writing we might associate it with and perhaps reduce it to a form 
of phallic supremacy. Or we might find ourselves reminded of Greek pederasty in 
its aboriginal relationship to philosophy (so many of Sade’s victims are children), 
where, in one reading, we observe how over and again “a greater man penetrates a 
lesser man with his knowledge” (according to what some see as a classic paradigm 
in Western pedagogy).
xxi
 Such conclusions are too easy, however. Though Sade’s 
texts are all about penetration, the penetrating agent is not singular in its form, nor 
is it always modeled on the phallus. The libertine often “socratizes” (as Sade calls 
it) by other means, and does so not merely for pleasure, or to dominate, but for 
purposes of examination in both a medical and educational sense. The libertine will 
enter the body by any means, cutting into it if necessary. And in so doing, the better 
libertine, like the better educator, does not simply “put in”; the libertine also “leads 
out” from what is already there.xxii Libertine mastery depends upon an investigation 
into the internal consistency of human kind, of what makes us tick, of how our 
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juices flow, of how we err. The libertine renders Man in the abstract sense entirely 
material, destroying the conceit of Man by making Man the object of study, which 
leads to the most intimate and base observations. Libertine investigation is at once 
an inquiry into what we are in body and of what must be overcome.
xxiii
 Hence 
mastery of this kind is less assured, and more intricated with the problems of an 
“irrational bodily materiality” than we might otherwise assume.xxiv With Sade, 
mastery eventually confronts the impossibility of its realization. It destroys itself in 
the attempt. 
The libertine’s self-mastery reaches towards complete egoism, complete in the 
sense that the libertine remains unaffected by the effects of his or her crimes. Self-
possessed, deracinated, the libertine ego can indulge itself without consideration. 
The libertine’s crimes obey no external logic or internal demand; they are an 
expression of the libertine’s own prolific creativity. Becoming inaccessible to 
others, the libertine asserts his or her will without appeal.
xxv
 In this sense the 
libertine’s mastery is complete; the libertine wilfully creates, even destroys him or 
herself for no other reason. But this exalted state is only achieved at great expense, 
by defeating Man, God, and even Nature (though not necessarily in that order). The 
libertine must overcome each framework of appeal through force of will alone, 
exaggerating each metaphysical attachment to the point of its own annulment. 
Through the pursuit of mastery, even mastery itself must eventually expire.
xxvi
 
 
Mastery to Excess 
In Blanchot’s view, Sade remains a “prodigious enigma” so long as we fail to 
interrogate the logic exemplified in his work.
xxvii
 Perhaps last of all will we permit a 
confrontation between Sade and education, for Sade threatens education as he 
threatens reason, not by stepping outside its boundaries, but by exaggerating its own 
inherently debauched tendencies to dramatic effect.
xxviii
 
With Sade we find depicted “sovereign man,” inaccessible because nothing 
can hurt him.
xxix
 Women frequently appear in Sade’s writing, of course, but only in 
relation to Man’s dominion, specifically that is, in relation to the gendered idea of 
mastery, that which involves mastery of himself and others. Sovereign man is then, 
in Sade’s work, an exaggerated representation of that gendered epithet ‘man’ which 
still defines the thinking of Western modernity. For all its evils, Sade’s work at least 
keeps that presence, the existence of a conception of man behind the conception of 
mastery upon which so much violence is built, in constant view.  
A sovereign of this cast of mind dominates others and tortures them with such 
delight in order to experience just how dispassionate he has become. What is 
murder to him? Nothing but “a little organized matter disorganized; a few 
compositional changes, the combination of some molecules disturbed and 
broken…tossed back into the crucible of nature.”xxx This libertine will, as Juliette’s 
first teacher explains: “execute every atrocity, great and small, with a constant and 
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inviolable serenity.”xxxi He or she knows “how to turn all distaste into tastes, all 
repugnance into attractions.” This libertine “sets about accomplishing the enormous 
task of completely enumerating every anomaly, every distraction, every human 
possibility. Sovereign man must experience everything in order to be at the mercy 
of nothing.”xxxii The libertine even welcomes the gallows with pleasure.xxxiii 
“Against such a Power, what can the law do? It intends to punish such a man, but it 
rewards him, and it thrills him by demeaning him.”xxxiv The libertine is sovereign 
for that reason. But he or she is sovereign in the more complete sense that each time 
a victim is sacrificed, the libertine decides “to sacrifice a thousand more.” The 
libertine is not tied to the victim in a relation of dependence. A libertine does not 
derive meaning from the individual he or she annihilates; this victim barely exists 
for her or him as a distinct sentient being. Each victim is “but a simple component, 
indefinitely exchangeable, within an enormous erotic equation.”xxxv  
Mastery of such monstrous proportions is not achieved without considerable 
effort. The libertine becomes sovereign man only after passing through all prior 
stages of debauchery. In the less practised libertine we discover he or she who 
derives pleasure from aggravating the plight of others. His or hers is a “pleasure of 
comparison”—where the suffering of others only brings out, by way of contrast, his 
own happiness.
xxxvi
 The libertine’s mastery is dependent on the subjugation of 
others, which brings into question the libertine’s own strength, for “by comparing 
his situation with that of the wretched, the fortunate man ineluctably identifies 
himself with the wretched one.” At this intermediate stage, the mind of the libertine 
“remains riveted on the reality of the other, which it seeks to deny… The debauchee 
remains attached to the victim of his lusts.” He or she is obsessed with the victim’s 
suffering and this is the libertine’s weakness. This debauchee has not yet achieved 
sovereignty. The libertine’s pride and his sense of self-worth is dependent on the 
defeat of others. Sovereign man by contrast “does not attach himself to any object; 
caught up in the perpetual motion of nature, he obeys his impulses and looks upon 
nature’s creatures as no more than its foam.”xxxvii  
Sovereign man may have succeeded in detaching himself from the pleasure of 
comparison, and yet, the pursuit of mastery has him enslaved to a destructive, 
ultimately self-destructive path of voluptuous annihilation. Like the extreme ascetic 
so feared by Cassian, the soul that wishes to become free must first destroy all 
pleasure, removing every last temptation. Unlike the ascetic, the libertine does so by 
pursuing all temptation, destroying all pleasures, and in so doing destroys 
everything else besides. Hence Sade’s writings are “littered with the corpses of 
libertines, struck down at the height of their glory.”xxxviii Sovereign man may have 
achieved mastery, but he does so by annihilating all things, including himself. By 
reducing all he touches to nothing, the most practised libertine “only makes this 
nothingness manifest.” The world in which he lives “is a desert; the beings he 
encounters there are less than things, less than shadows. While studying them, 
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tormenting them and destroying them, he does not seize upon their life, but verifies 
their nothingness. He becomes master of their nonexistence, and he draws great 
pleasure from this.”xxxix Quite literally the libertine realises his nihilism. He follows 
through that tradition in Western metaphysics which associates being with a higher 
realm, denigrating this world below by associating it with a process of transient (if 
not grubby) becoming. This world is nothing by comparison to the world above, a 
prejudice that Sade takes great pleasure in exploiting. Sade pursues that “disavowal 
of reality” (and of women in particular) upon which “the language of the West” was 
built,
xl
 by treating its members as they conceptualise themselves, by approaching 
them as if they were “already dead,” as if they were already worth nothing.xli  
In Sade’s world those seeking mastery achieve it through an enormous, 
monstrous negation. Blanchot again: “This negation, which is carried out on a 
massive scale, which no individual instance is enough to satisfy, is essentially 
destined to surpass the plane of human existence.” This transcendence by negation 
is achieved with a kind of boldness that no philosopher has managed to achieve 
hitherto (despite it being the philosopher’s secret desire).xlii Sadean man frees 
himself in relation to his victim because he wishes to exist independently. He 
wishes to become the perfect philosopher by virtue of his separation from worldly 
things. Admittedly, he does so by engaging in carnal acts, but he is never consumed 
by the act. For all his commitment to bodily perversion he remains a philosopher. 
As Simone de Beauvoir once put it, sovereign man never “looses himself in his 
animal nature”; his perversions are so premeditated and cerebral that “philosophic 
discourse, far from dampening his ardor, acts as an aphrodisiac.”xliii With Sade we 
find the wildest hope of philosophy realised; “a lucid mind inhabits a body which is 
being degraded into matter.”xliv  
But Sadean man does not stop there. He reduces God to nothing also, and 
thereby reveals not only the monstrous negation upon which Western philosophy is 
built, but also what Nietzsche describes as the “empty fiction” that once justified 
such negation.
xlv
  For the world was denied in the name of otherworldly beings and 
ideas, in the name of spectres that finally coalesced, with Christianity, in the figure 
of God. With Christianity, knowledge of God and access to heaven became 
dependent on practices of Christian self-denial. And yet, as Sade portrays it, this 
monstrous order of discourse will itself eventually crumble, for nihilism entails the 
“death of God” too, in a final painful, drawn-out negation.xlvi Again in Sade’s hands 
this death is too much even for today’s atheist to stomach. Sovereign man hopes to 
first negate but eventually become indifferent to God. He no longer derives 
strength, as many atheisms do, from a rejection of God.  
Sade fulfils Western metaphysics by “founding man’s sovereignty on the 
transcending power of negation, a power that depends in no way upon the objects 
that it destroys, which in order to destroy them, does not even suppose their 
existence beforehand.” But then, as Blanchot argues, he goes one further. Sade 
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rejects the idea of God as the “inexpiable fault of man, his original sin, the proof of 
his emptiness.”xlvii Sade again: 
 
The very conceiving of this so infinitely disgusting phantom is, I 
confess it, the one wrong I am unable to forgive man. I excuse him all 
his whims, his ironies, and his eccentricities, I sympathize with all his 
frailties, but I cannot smile tolerantly upon the lunacy that could erect 
this monster, I do not pardon man for having himself wrought those 
religious chains which have so dreadfully hobbled him and for having 
crept despicably forward, eyes downcast and neck stretched forth, to 
receive the shameful collar manufactured only by his own stupidity. 
There would be no end to it, Juliette, were I to give vent to all the 
horror waked in me by the execrable doctrine based upon a God’s 
existence; mere mention of him rouses my ire, when I hear his name 
pronounced I seem to see all around me the palpitating shades of all 
those woebegone creatures this abominable opinion has slaughtered 
on the face of the earth. Those ghosts cry out beseechingly to me, they 
supplicate me to make use of all I have been endowed with of force 
and ingenuity to erase from the souls of my brethren the idea of the 
revolting chimera which has brought such rue into the world.
xlviii
  
 
This chimera Sade rejects is “what justifies and authorizes” those crimes he 
imagines “for we cannot be too forceful in our efforts to annihilate a being who is 
willing to bow down and prostrate himself before God.”xlix The idea of God reduces 
man to nothingness, Sade perceives, since man conceives of himself as owing 
everything to that idea however vaguely it may be expressed. Indeed, the idea of 
God derives its strength from the fact that God must remain unknown, from the fact 
that “his ineffable ways surpass understanding, that he waxes wroth as soon as 
anyone has the temerity to pry into his secrets.”l Those seeking mastery have, then, 
no option but to make God manifest, to give definite form to man’s conception of 
divine sovereignty and reign over men like Gods. To remove the last vestiges of 
religious faith, Sadean man “momentarily becomes God, so that, when in his 
presence, other men become inconsequential and then realize exactly to what extent 
a being before God is sheer nothingness... Being God can only mean one thing: 
crushing men, annihilating creation.”li Thus Sadean man finally destroys any last 
vestige of God by assuming His image, and destroys men by acting out the 
consequences of their image of themselves as reflected in their conception of God, 
showing how in creating God they inaugurated their own destruction. 
Sade finally rejects God in the spirit of negation, for in God “he hates the 
nothingness of man—who created such a master for himself.” Though Sade would 
temporarily “work with God to sanction this nothingness”—to express the 
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destructive logic in the idea of God and bring it to its conclusion—he does not 
become Godlike for more time than is necessary.
lii
 Sade eventually gives up even 
hating God, or so Blanchot’s argues, for in hating God, Sade affirms God by 
negation. Hence his hatred of God must finally mature until it “liberates hate from 
God.”liii Sade’s hate is “too great to be contained by just one object.” He identifies 
instead with that “spirit of destruction” he associates with Nature.liv Yet Nature too 
becomes unbearable. By aligning himself with Nature, Sade finds himself 
“constantly confronted” with its “insurmountable and sovereign presence.”lv Nature 
as conceived by Man (that gendered construct of Western modernity), dooms us to a 
pursuit we can never fulfil. We are formed, Sade tells us, so that we would wish to 
outrage her, but as Nature herself is a spirit of destruction, there is no outrage, no 
act of destruction, that can escape her embrace. As the libertine Pope explains, 
addressing Nature:  
 
Thou, unreasoning and reasonless force of which I find myself the 
involuntary result, Thou who hurled me into this world with the desire 
that I offend Thee, and who hast however denied me the means to do 
so, inspire in my blazing soul those crimes which would serve Thee 
better than these poor melancholy things Thou hast put inside my 
reach. I would obey Thy laws, since they require horrors of me and for 
horrors I have a fiery thirst; but provide me better to do than Thy 
debility has given me so far. When I have exterminated all the 
creatures that cover the earth, still shall I be far from my mark, since I 
shall have merely served Thee, O unkind Mother, for it is to 
vengeance I aspire, vengeance for what, whether through stupidity or 
malice, Thou doest to men in never furnishing them the means to 
translate fairly into deeds the appalling desires Thou dost ever rouse in 
them.
lvi
  
 
This is how Sadean man “gradually becomes aggravated” by Nature.lvii His 
sovereignty will not bear comparison when set against the supremacy of Nature. 
Nature too must studied, and subjected to libertine probing,
lviii
 but it must also be 
finally negated. And so we find imagined a great cataclysm that would destroy the 
very laws of Nature. Sade imagines an engineer of such accomplishment that he 
creates a machine to “pulverize the universe.”lix But even this, for Sade, would not 
suffice.  
By his imagined defeat of Nature, Sade’s mastery once again becomes 
dependent upon, and presumes the existence of, that which he destroys. What he 
“pursued by pushing the spirit of negation to its limit is sovereignty.”lx He sought 
after that sovereign mastery which does not depend upon its ability to defeat once 
superior forces, that mastery which creates and destroys without appeal. Through 
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the pursuit of mastery and after so much destruction, Sade eventually sacrifices 
mastery itself, travelling beyond good and evil, and beyond value itself. He realises 
that it is not sufficient to ensure that the other is reduced to nothing through its 
destruction. For, as Klossowski argued in Sade My Neighbour, “if the other is 
nothing for me... I am not only nothing for him but also nothing before my own 
consciousness—and in fact that consciousness is no longer still mine.”lxi Here we 
are left with the last effects of Sade’s Reason, mastery (and hence education) 
destroys itself; it reduces sovereign man to nothing since if he is something he must 
exist in dependent relation to something else. We arrive at the “negation of 
destruction itself.”lxii  
The destruction of objects belies the dependence of the destroyer on those 
things he annihilates. So what better way to remove that dependence, Sade decides, 
than to depreciate it by becoming apathetic to destruction itself. Now the simple 
“quantity of the objects sacrificed, becomes the object of these acts.” Deriving little 
from their destruction, these acts being too numerous to count or even notice, the 
“reality of the other and of the self are dissolved.”lxiii As Horkheimer and Adorno 
put it, little but a “tense, purposive bustle prevails” in which “no moment is unused, 
no body orifice neglected, no function left inactive.”lxiv The libertine disappears “in 
an endless reiteration of acts.”lxv He romps without purpose, remaining active for no 
other reason. Like today’s educator yet shorn of all romantic illusion sovereign man 
in his last iteration operates “devoid of any substantial goals,”lxvi everything he 
touches is apprehended “in terms of manipulation and administration.”lxvii As Sade’s 
Chief of Police declares: 
 
It does indeed seem that the lamp of reason does not begin to 
enlighten us until such time as we are no longer able to profit from its 
rays, and not before stupidity has been added to stupidity that we 
arrive at the discovery of the source of all that ignorance has caused us 
to commit.
lxviii
 
 
Let us treat this remark with the seriousness it deserves. Once Sade’s reason has run 
its full course and mastery has emptied itself of all content, there is nothing left to 
say. After so many lessons we find ourselves stripped bare, piling stupidity upon 
stupidity. This is what education for mastery becomes. 
 
Mastery or Failure 
Sade’s direction of travel is also our own, insofar as we too are suffering the effects 
of “European nihilism.”lxix But our collective travel is less deliberate: we kill Man, 
God and Nature without fully intending to. This killing of each is built into the 
pursuit of mastery that we (unlike Sade) disavow. Sade only brings to the surface 
that brutalism inherent in Western education, which negates and negates 
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monstrously, in order to affirm. It is perhaps conceivable that, if this tendency were 
fully acknowledged, if the grotesque nature of our dream, our pursuit of mastery 
were fully manifested, we might develop the strength to reject it as our educational 
objective; and not by returning to that dirty compromise of mastery through 
enslavement which kills though it does so quietly; rather we might pursue its 
opposite, which is failure, a failure to master others and ourselves.  
Mastery or failure, these are the options given us by education. Mastery is 
promised through a sleight of hand that prevents its delivery (we become enslaved 
to the pursuit of something that is rarely if ever realised), whilst failure of a kind is 
guaranteed. Educational failure is far more common and systematically produced 
than we would like to admit. In short, if one did not fail, another would not succeed; 
the mastery of those who succeed is dependent on the existence of those multitudes 
that fail. We are in a position similar to that of the debauched libertine still reliant 
on the “pleasure of comparison”—educational success remains dependent on 
educational failure, on negation (and educational failure remains dependent by 
comparison with educational success). We are not simply waiting for the “right” 
pedagogy to be applied “successfully” so that failure can be removed.lxx Described 
as the “traumatic real” of contemporary education, failure belies the barbarism of 
educational mastery and the fantasy of an educational good.
lxxi
 In a perverse cycle 
of affirmation, education is offered as the solution to the problem, that of systemic 
failure, which education creates. Failure is the necessary consequence of that 
nihilism which attaches us to promises that are never delivered, which makes us its 
inevitable disappointments. The educated nihilist would not retreat from failure, 
then. This figure would not seek to heal education of that affliction, since failure 
constitutes education. Yet even for the educated nihilist this is difficult to fully 
admit: It really is traumatic for the educator who is by profession wedded to an 
ideology of educational success.  
Our options are limited by our histories and appear radically opposed. We 
might affirm mastery and redefine it as Sade once did so that our mastery is no 
longer dependant on the failure of others. Or we might pursue its opposite, failure. 
This, too, might constitute a route through nihilism. Accordingly we would embrace 
failure, learning to fail better. We would seek to fail without appeal, attempting to 
fail on our own terms. Our failures would fall outside the shadow of a promised 
mastery. This affirmation of failure would raise the devil, that “Spirit of Heaviness” 
through which “all things fall.”lxxii It would give homage to that metaphysical ghost 
which nihilism both produces and suffers. It would confront that spirit in its 
incorruptible substance, and understand how it was first and forever since conjured 
by man. Having nothing in common with matter, this Spirit of Heaviness leaves us 
with the sensation of falling. We are confronted by things that will no longer be 
suspended aloft. These things fall, we fall with them, and in our descent we begin to 
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accomplish our nihilism.
lxxiii
 This fallout we perceive as the necessary outcome of 
that unnecessary belief in spectral things, ideas, Gods. 
Our affirmation of failure would be deliberate, giving expression to our 
nihilism, revealing its downward tendencies so they are better negotiated. We 
would no longer kill Man, God and Nature without fully intending to. Rather, we 
would seek to understand how this killing is brought about as a consequence of our 
education.
lxxiv
 We would investigate our nihilism, so as to acknowledge it, better 
express it, and confront our downgoing.  
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